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 [I]n this Organon of ours we are dealing with logic, not philosophy. But our logic 
instructs the understanding and trains it, not (as the common logic does) to grope 
and clutch at abstracts with feeble mental tendrils, but to dissect the powers and 
actions of bodies and their laws limned in matter [in materia determinatas].1  
 
The way of laws is as much a defining feature of the modern period as the way of ideas. In 
one of its forms, it stands as an alternative to the moribund Aristotelian ontology. A world devoid 
of powers is, in Ralph Cudworth’s memorable phrase, ‘a dead cadaverous thing,’2 and explaining 
why objects in it behave as they do requires appeal to something other than their intrinsic 
properties. For Descartes and his followers, the way of laws leads to occasionalism. Since bodies 
cannot obey laws in any but a metaphorical sense, God must be moving them around himself.3  
But the way of laws is hardly without its forks. Both before and after Descartes, there are 
philosophers using the concept of laws to carve out a very different position from his. Descartes’s 
application of the concept of law in the context of physics has been so influential as to make this 
competing position all but invisible. Here, I uncover what is, as far as I can tell, an unappreciated 
																																																						
1 Francis Bacon, New Organon II.lii: 219-20. (References to the ‘NO’ are to the Michael Silverthorne translation and 
are in the following form: Book.aphorism: page number in Bacon 2000a.) Compare Spinoza’s appendix to Part Four 
of the Ethics, section xxvii: ‘The principle advantage we derive from things outside us – apart from the experience 
and knowledge we acquire from observing them and changing them from one form into another – lies in the 
preservation of our body.’ (References to Spinoza’s Ethics and Letter 32 are to the Curley translation in Spinoza 
(1985). References to other works are to Shirley’s translation (2002) unless otherwise noted. When referring to the 
Ethics, I first give the part, proposition, and then (S) scholium, (L) lemma, (D) demonstration, (A) axiom, or (C) 
corollary, if applicable. Thus ‘2p13L1’ refers to Part II, proposition 13, Lemma 1. The Latin text is from the Gebhardt 
edition of 1925.) 
2 Cudworth (1837, vol.1, 209). 
3 I make this argument at length in my (2009). 
sense of ‘law,’ one that is entirely disconnected from God or God’s will. This branch of the way 
of laws antedates Descartes’s work in the person of Francis Bacon, and post-dates it in that of 
Baruch Spinoza. Both philosophers reject the portrait of the world as an inanimate lump, dependent 
on God to shove it about. If I am right, Bacon and Spinoza tread a different path, one that is actively 
opposed to the inert mechanical conception of nature.4 Roughly, a law of a thing’s nature is the set 
of powers that defines that nature. Different natures have (or just are) different laws, and they can 
restrain and interfere with each other.  
Descartes’s introduction of leges exploits one facet of the legal analogy: the sense in which 
a prince or king can lay down a set of rules his subjects must obey. In just the same way, 
Descartes’s God gives extended substance its marching orders. Bacon and Spinoza point to a 
different facet of the legal analogy: the sense in which laws describe what must happen in a variety 
of different circumstances. To fully grasp a nature like heat is to learn all of the conditionals that 
are true of it in virtue of its powers, and those of the natures it can encounter. By pointing to this 
feature of the civil law, Bacon and Spinoza decline the seventeenth century’s invitation to move 
beyond powers and into the cadaverous world of mechanism. Fully grasping this alternative, I 
argue, requires us to re-think Spinoza’s metaphysics of causation.  
I begin by unearthing the concept in the work of Francis Bacon, who, no less than Spinoza, 
thinks of laws as being ‘inscribed’ in ‘things [a legibus in iis rebus inscriptis], as in their true 
codes, according to which all singular things come to be, and are ordered.’5 I then turn to Spinoza’s 
																																																						
4 My focus is on the non-human world. I am concerned with laws as they play a role in physics, as opposed to 
morality or the law. Donald Rutherford (2010) helpfully distinguishes between what he calls Type-I laws, which 
‘express natural necessity,’ and Type-II laws, which depend on human decisions and have prescriptive force. 
Rutherford mounts an ingenious argument designed to show that Type-II laws are not an irreducibly novel category 
of laws but instead are ‘principles of natural necessity grounded in the inherent power of the human mind’ (2010, 
167). Thus Type-I laws are fundamental; Type-II can be seen as a special case of natural necessity as it is worked 
out in the sphere of human agency. Though nothing in my analysis depends upon it, Rutherford’s reading strikes me 
as plausible and consistent with what I say here. 
5 Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, §101 (1985, 41). 
Letter 32, which, I argue, moves from what we might call the ‘human image’ of the physical world 
to its true metaphysical image. The following section explores the Ethics, which moves in the 
opposite direction: we begin with the skeletal metaphysical truth and then reconstruct the world as 
it appears to us in experience. Finally, I draw out the consequences of this reading for the rest of 
Spinoza’s view.   
 
1. 
 At first sight, Bacon’s thoughts on laws, even with a single text like the Novum Organon, 
are a disappointing mishmash of unanalyzed jargon. He tells us that substances have laws,6 that 
laws govern acts,7 that laws are forms, which in turn are forms of natures,8 and, to make matters 
worse, that forms derive natures from essences.9 Sometimes he speaks as if laws govern simple 
natures like heat; at other times, as if the laws just were the simple natures; and in one startling 
sentence, he does both at once: ‘when I speak of forms, I mean nothing more than those laws and 
determinations of absolute actuality which govern [ordinant] and constitute any simple nature, as 
heat, light, weight, in every kind of matter and subject that is susceptible of them.’10 
Before sorting through all of this, we have to remove a barrier to understanding Bacon. 
There is a strong temptation fold Bacon into the wave of mechanical philosophers that was 
sweeping Europe.11 For such philosophers, Aristotle’s four causes are gradually whittled down to 
one: the efficient cause. All other kinds of explanation are either epistemically out of reach (the 
final cause, since it is impossible to know the mind of God),12 or part of the detested hylomorphism 
																																																						
6 NO II.iv: 104.  
7 NO I.li: 45, II.ii: 103, II.v: 106. 
8 NO II.ii: 102-3. 
9 NO II.iv: 104. 
10 NO II.xvii: 128. 
11 As Gaukroger (2001) tends to do. 
12 As Descartes tells Gassendi, ‘[w]e cannot pretend that some of God’s purposes are more out in the open than others; 
of the scholastics (the formal and material causes).13 On one isotope of this sort of view, found in 
Robert Boyle and John Locke, the ultimate hope of natural philosophy is uncovering the micro-
level structures that explain the efficient causal interactions among bodies.14 
Reading such views back into Bacon is a mistake. Bacon opens Book II of the NO by 
endorsing the four causes of Aristotle. His reservations are actually focused on the efficient and 
material causes: they are ‘perfunctory, superficial things, of almost no value for true, active 
knowledge.’15 Knowing what something is made of, or what produces such-and-such an effect, 
falls short of ‘true’ knowledge partly because it does not help one re-produce the effect, which is 
the aim of ‘active’ knowledge. Bacon is well aware this emphasis on forms will sound odd, since 
he has made fun of the scholastics’ empty jargon in Part I. Here is his replacement doctrine of 
forms: 
 
For though nothing exists in nature except individual bodies which exhibit pure 
individual acts (‘actus puros’) in accordance with law, in philosophical doctrine, 
that law itself, and the investigation, discovery and explanation of it, are taken as 
the foundation both of knowing and doing. It is this law and its clauses which we 
																																																						
all are equally hidden in the inscrutable abyss of his wisdom’ (AT VII 375/CSM II 258). See also Meditation Four, 
AT VII 55/CSM II 39. (References to Descartes are to the Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch translation (CSM) 
and to Adam and Tannery’s edition of Descartes’s work (AT). 
13 For the contraction of the four causes into efficient cause, see esp. Vincent Carraud (2002). 
14 Locke of course is skeptical that this aim could be achieved; nevertheless, when he allows himself to speculate about 
an idealized science, what he envisions fits my reading. For example, Locke writes, ‘If we could discover the Figure, 
Size, Texture, and Motion of the minute Constituent parts of any two Bodies, we should know without Trial several 
of their Operations one upon another, as we do now the Properties of a Square, or Triangle…The dissolving of Silver 
in aqua fortis, and Gold in aqua Regia, would be, then, perhaps, no more difficult to know, than it is to a Smith to 
understand, why the turning of one Key will open a Lock, and not the turning of another’ (IV.iii.25, in Locke 
1689/1975, 556).  
15 NO II.ii: 102. The final cause is ‘a long way from being useful’ except in cases of human action. 
understand by the term Forms, especially as this word has become established and 
is in common use.16    
 
Some commentators, such as Stephen Gaukroger, try to read such passages away, as if Bacon 
really meant to be talking about matter and its arrangement rather than law.17 Such a move is 
unmotivated if, as I shall argue, we can in fact make good sense of these passages.18  
 When a body engages in an ‘actus puros,’ it acts in a way that is not interfered with or 
distorted by another body.19 Such activities will of course be the most informative about a given 
nature. Now, most bodies will be composites of the simple natures, such as heat. So the task of 
natural philosophy is to separate out these simple natures and learn their laws. Bacon conceives of 
laws as including clauses that detail how something possessed of the form in question will behave 
under such-and-such circumstances, just as a clause in statute law details how the law is meant to 
apply to particular cases.20 
Note just how foreign this way of thinking is to its main competitors, whether Aristotelian 
or Cartesian. The scholastic notion of a form as a principle of explanation in its own right is 
rejected; such forms are ‘figments of the human mind,’ unless by ‘form’ one just means ‘the law 
of act or motion.’21 And unlike the Cartesian conception, there is no suggestion that there might 
be just one set of laws governing the whole universe: there are irreducibly different natures out 
																																																						
16 NO II.ii: 103. Similarly, Newton says that he takes principles like cohesion and gravity not as ‘occult qualities, 
supposed to result from the specific forms of things, but as general laws of nature, by which the things themselves are 
formed’ (2004, 137) 
17 See Gaukroger (2001, 140 f.) for an ingenious attempt to read away the textual evidence. 
18 For other places in NO where Bacon treats forms as laws, see, e.g., I.li: 45, II.v: 106, II.xvii: 128. 
19 As Jonathan Bennett suggests in his commentary on the passage; see his earlymoderntexts.com. For another use of 
the phrase, see NO I.li: 45. 
20 Jardine and Silverthorne note the analogy with statute law in Bacon (2000, 103, n.2). 
21 I.li in Bacon 2002, 45. 
there, each with its own set of laws.22 What is more important, Bacon’s conception of laws is 
thoroughly bottom-up. 
 So far, Bacon’s system seems unnecessarily crowded: we have natures, forms as laws, and 
even essences, all vying for the role of explanans. Throughout Book II, Bacon cleans up his system 
by collapsing some of these into others.23 Aphorism iv tells us that form and nature always go 
together: when the form of heat is present, so is the nature, and when the form is absent, so is the 
nature. By the time he reaches xvii, Bacon has decided to identify these.  
 
When we speak of forms, we mean simply those laws and limitations of pure act 
which govern [‘ordinant’] and constitute a simple nature, like heat, light, or weight, 
in every kind of susceptible material and subject. The form of heat therefore or the 
form of light is the same thing as the law of heat or the law of light, and we never 
abstract or withdraw from things themselves and the operative side. And so when 
we say (for example) in the inquiry into the form of heat, Reject rarity, or, rarity is 
not of the form of heat, it is the same as if we said, Man can superinduce heat on a 
																																																						
22 Gaukroger notes that Bacon sometimes speaks of fundamental and universal laws. For example, at NO II.v, Bacon 
writes that the inquiries into such things as the voluntary motion of animals ‘are concerned with compound natures, 
or natures which are joint members of a structure; and they have regard to special and particular habits of nature, not 
the fundamental and common laws which constitute Forms’ (NO II.v: 106). Gaukroger reads this as an endorsement 
of ‘general laws of nature’ (2001, 141); Bacon’s point, in part, is that it is not enough to know the general laws of 
nature in order to explain the motions of animals. But there is no suggestion in the text that there is a single law, or 
set of laws, that governs all of nature, as Gaukroger thinks. When Bacon talks about the ‘fundamental and common 
laws which constitute Forms,’ he is referring to the dispositions that constitute simple, as opposed to composite, 
natures. The contrast Bacon draws is between simple and composite natures, not between specific laws (say, of 
mechanics) and more general ones. 
23 In fact, Bacon goes further and identifies a thing with its form. See, e.g., NO II.xiii: 119, where Bacon writes, ‘The 
Form of a thing is the very thing itself. And a thing does not differ from its form other than as apparent and actual 
differ, or exterior and interior…and hence it follows that a nature is accepted as a true form unless it always decreases 
when the nature itself decreases and increases when the nature increases.’ 
dense body, or on the other hand, Man can take away heat or bar it from a rare 
body. 24 
 
Forms, then, are nothing more than laws. But how can Bacon at once identify the laws with the 
simple nature and claim that the laws ordinant that nature? Clearly he can’t have it both ways. The 
problem here is an ambiguity in Bacon’s notion of a nature. In its usual use, ‘a nature’ is a non-
dispositional feature or property that we can experience, such as light or heat.25 Natures stand in 
need of explanation. This explanation might take two forms: one might give the material cause, 
which is the underlying stuff and its organization. In this sense, the nature heat is expansive 
motion. But as we have seen, Bacon regards this as being of relatively little interest to the natural 
philosopher. What counts is the formal cause, that is, the dispositions or powers. From a 
contemporary perspective, it is tempting to go further and claim that the dispositions described by 
the forms/laws are grounded in the structure of the matter in question. And that may very well be 
what Bacon has in mind, though it is not strictly speaking there in the text. A word for a nature 
like ‘heat’ might equally well refer to (i) the categorical property we experience, (ii) the forms/laws 
or dispositions that go along with that property, or (iii) the ultimate micro-structure that grounds 
those laws.26 
 So when Bacon says that forms/laws govern or organize a nature, he means nature in sense 
(iii), the micro-structure. And when he says that forms/laws constitute a nature, he means nature 
in sense (i), the property we experience. And, trivially, when he says that forms/laws are natures, 
																																																						
24 NO II.xvii: 128. For consistency, I am rendering ‘ordinant’ as ‘govern’ rather than ‘organise,’ as this translation of 
NO has it.  
25 Here I ignore the difference, which Bacon registers, between heat as felt and heat as it is in the world. See NO II.xx: 
131, where Bacon claims that ‘[h]eat as felt is a relative thing…and it is rightly regarded as merely the effect of heat 
on the animal spirit.’ Throughout, I use ‘heat’ in Bacon’s second sense, that is, as the non-relative nature that exists 
independently of its being felt. 
26 For (iii), see esp. NO I.li: 45, where Bacon recommends the study of ‘matter, and its structure (schematismus).’  
he is using the term in sense (ii). It is annoying but entirely to natural for Bacon to slide from one 
of these senses to another. From here on, I’ll use nature in sense (i) only, as the explanandum rather 
than explanans. 
 There is a final layer of complexity. It is important, I think, to take Bacon seriously when 
he elects to open Book II of the NO by saying that ‘[t]he task and purpose of human Science is to 
find for a given nature its Form, or true difference…’27 Nor is this an isolated claim; Bacon goes 
on to say that laws/forms act as differentiae which contract an ‘essence’ into a determinate nature.28 
A true form ‘derives a given nature from the source of an essence which exists in several 
subjects.’29 But what can this mean? 
 Since forms/laws are differentiae, Bacon must be using ‘essence’ to mean ‘genus,’ a not 
unnatural usage. So multiple natures can share an essence or genus; we need to find what sets one 
off from the other. And that something is the form/law that characterizes it. Heat, for example, is 
not just motion, an essence that can be shared across many natures. Heat is motion that behaves in 
a particular way, namely, it tends to expand. This is why forms are the verae rerum differentiae. 
 So we now have a nature (e.g., heat) whose form just is its laws, that is, the set of 
dispositions that characterize its behavior. Finding the form amounts to true and active knowledge 
because knowing those dispositions tells you how to bring it about and control it. Although there 
is nothing in the physical world beyond bodies and their acts, the goal of science is the discovery 
of forms/laws, not of the micro-structures that underwrite them. These forms are captured in 
propositions that describe possible states of affairs and could equally be cast as conditionals. What 
																																																						
27 ‘…or causative nature or the source of its coming-to-be (these are the words that we have that come closest to 
describing the thing)’ (II.i: 102). 
28 ‘[A] true form is such that it derives a given nature from the source of an essence which exists in several subjects’ 
(II.iv in Bacon 2002, 104. Bacon identifies the forms with these differentiae; he speaks of the ‘forms or true differences 
of things (which are in fact laws of pure act)’ (I.lxxv in Bacon 2002, 62). 
29 NO II.iv: 104. 
makes these conditional or modal statements true will be the powers of the objects that figure in 
them. What grounds these dispositions, in turn, will presumably be matter and its structure. 
While Bacon is often cast as a harbinger of mechanism, he retains something vitally 
important of Aristotelianism: the emphasis on the explanatory (and predictive) power of power.30 
Even if, as Gaukroger maintains, for Bacon ‘the ultimate ingredients’ of things are matter 
structured in such-and-such a way, Bacon’s notion of the law of a given nature remains the ultimate 
ingredient of explanation and the target of scientific inquiry.31 
 Bacon’s view can be illuminated by contrasting it with Descartes’s. For Descartes, the laws 
of nature are captured by propositions such as ‘each thing…always remains in the same state, as 
far as it can, and never changes except as a result of external causes.’32 Such propositions are 
necessarily true, at least so long as the nature and will of God remain constant.33 Descartes’s notion 
of laws is ‘top-down’ in the sense that the laws flow from the nature of the divine being, not the 
natures of the things that ‘obey’ them.34 Nothing could be further from Bacon’s unrepetently 
bottom-up approach.  
 Someone might well argue that the difference between Descartes and Bacon is merely 
verbal: if Bacon wants to use ‘law’ to mean power or disposition, he is welcome to it. The 
orthographic similarity of the terms about which they disagree does not necessarily mark 
disagreement. I think this objection misses the point. My claim is that Descartes and Bacon are 
																																																						
30 ‘The task of science is to find for a given nature its Form, or true difference, or causative nature, or the source of its 
coming-to-be’ (NO II.i: 102). 
31 See Gaukroger (2001, 140). 
32 Principles II.37, AT VIIIA 62/CSM I 240-1.  
33 Descartes’s thinking on modality, and the sense he gives to terms like ‘necessary,’ is obscure and controversial. My 
point here is only that, since the laws of nature follow from God’s nature and will, they hold in any world where those 
features of God obtain. 
34 See chapter 1 of my (2009) for more on the top-down/bottom-up distinction. There, I argue at length, pace Hattab 
(this volume) and others, that Descartes’s view of body-body causation has to be occasionalist. I won’t repeat those 
arguments here. 
both working with a recognizably legal metaphor. For Descartes, what counts is the arbitrariness 
of human laws, which are set down at will by the lawgiver. For Bacon, what counts is the structure 
of a statute law, with its extensive clauses designed to cover every possible case that might arise. 
Although either path along the way of laws can be consistent with the ontology of mechanism, 
they nevertheless point in different directions: top-down (Descartes) and bottom-up (Bacon). It 
remains now to see which path Spinoza will tread. 
 
2. 
We know from his correspondence that Spinoza read Bacon carefully. Even if he abuses 
Bacon when it comes to the nature of the intellect and the human mind, he also refers one of his 
correspondents to Bacon on just those issues.35 And he credits Bacon, alongside Descartes, as 
having proved that all qualities depend on matter and motion.36  
Bacon takes the first step away from the Aristotelian view when he trades in the scholastics’ 
vast panoply of natural kinds for a comparatively small number of simple natures.37 There is no 
way to reduce one of these simple natures to another; but learning this manageably small set of 
laws would amount to learning nature’s alphabet, the first step to deciphering its words. Spinoza, 
of course, wants to go much further. The important point is that he is going much further in the 
same direction as Bacon, not Descartes.38 
																																																						
35 See Letter 37 (1666) in Bacon (2002, 861).  
36 In Letter 6 (1661) (2002, 771 f.) Spinoza says that Lord Verulam, along with Descartes, has proved that all 
tangible qualities depend on motion, shape, and other mechanical states. 
37 In The Advancement of Learning, Bacon writes, ‘In the same maner to enquire the forme of a Lyon, of an Oake, of 
Gold; Nay of Water, of Aire, is a vaine pursuite: But to enquire the formes of Sence, of voluntary Motion, of 
Vegetation, of Colours, of Gravitie and Levitie, of Densitie, of Tenuitie, of Heate, of Cold, & al other Natures and 
qualities, which like an Alphabet are not many, & of which the essences (upheld by Matter) of all creatures doe consist; 
to enquire I say the true formes of these is that part of METAPHISICKE, which we now define of’ (1605/2000b, 84).  
38 In less technical works, Spinoza sometimes uses ‘lex’ in a very Cartesian way. For example, in the Tractatus 
Theologico-Politicus, he writes that ‘the universal laws of Nature according to which all things happen and are 
determined are nothing but God’s eternal decrees, which always involve eternal truth and necessity’ (2002, 417). A 
Part of what makes interpreting Spinoza so difficult is the transition he asks us to make, 
often without an explicit invitation, between the human image – the world seen from the limited, 
human point of view – and the metaphysical image. The world that we live in, and which natural 
philosophy is suited to investigate, is replete with bodies that have distinct natures or essences 
(such as man, horse, and insect).39 Seen from the point of view eternity, however, the physical 
world is a single substance that has only one nature, namely, extension.40 In my view, Spinoza’s 
Letter 32 (‘The Worm in the Blood’) enacts for us the transition from the manifest image to the 
metaphysical image, where bodies constitute a single super-individual, what Spinoza elsewhere 
calls ‘the face of the entire universe.’ Spinoza’s Ethics takes us in precisely the opposite direction. 
There, Spinoza begins with the metaphysical image and goes on to show how the human image 
can be reconstructed. There is no question but that the metaphysical image is fundamental. The 
challenge for Spinoza is to explain why the world as we experience it seems so very different.  
In this section, I focus on Letter 32. Here we travel from a human image, one that is 
recognizably Aristotelian, through a Baconian view, and end up finally with the world as it is in 
itself. Letter 32 illustrates how one might start by thinking of the world in terms of powers and or 
natures and end with an ontology that has room for only one nature and the patterns it produces.  
In this letter, Spinoza responds to a question from Oldenburg: ‘how [do] we know how 
each part of Nature agrees with the whole to which it belongs and how it coheres with the others’?41 
Whatever Oldenburg means by ‘coherence,’ Spinoza stipulates that ‘[b]y the coherence of parts, 
																																																						
bit later, however, he makes it clear that he is speaking analogically: ‘Still, it seems to be by analogy that the word 
law is applied to natural phenomena, and ordinarily ‘law’ is used to mean simply a command which men can either 
obey or disobey, inasmuch as it restricts the total range of human power within set limits and demands nothing that is 
beyond the capacity of that power’ (2002, 427). But Spinoza’s real view is even more distant from the Cartesian 
picture, since of course he rejects the whole notion of a God who stands outside of nature and sets out his ‘decrees.’ 
39 See, e.g., the Preface to Part IV of the Ethics. 
40 The one substance of course has an infinite number of attributes, of which we know only two, thought and extension. 
41 Spinoza (1994, 82).  
then, I understand nothing but that the laws or {sive} nature of the one part so adapt themselves to 
the laws or nature of the other part that they are opposed to each other as little as possible.’42 
Spinoza begins by insisting that we do not know how this happens, though we do know 
that it does. Even if there is only one substance, the natural world still seems, from the human 
point of view, to be divided into parts: 
 
Concerning wholes and parts, I consider things as parts of some whole insofar as 
the nature of the one so adapts itself to the nature of the other that so far as possible 
they are all in harmony with one another. But insofar as they are out of harmony 
with one another, to that extent each forms an idea distinct from the others in our 
mind, and therefore it is considered as a whole and not a part.43 
 
Whether a mereologically neutral ‘thing’ is a whole or a part is a function of harmony and 
coherence. When we consider two things as two, that is, as two wholes, that is because their 
disharmony produces two distinct ideas in the mind. Now we know that disharmony is ultimately 
an illusion, as is the two-ness of the two, or the n-ness of the n. Nevertheless, at this initial stage, 
we attribute distinct and competing natures and laws, that is, distinct powers, to distinct parts of 
the natural world.  
We can now confront the central puzzle of Letter 32: what could Spinoza mean by speaking 
of the laws of a thing’s nature? Once we see the Baconian context, and construe laws as powers, 
Spinoza’s text comes into focus. The laws of a thing’s nature just are the powers it has. This is 
																																																						
42 Spinoza (1994, 82). Note that Curley’s italicized ‘or’ translates sive, which indicates an equivalence rather than an 
alternative. 
43 1994, 82-3. 
why Spinoza can speak indifferently of laws or natures and laws of natures. Either way, what 
makes heat heat is what it does in such-and-such circumstances.   
 Spinoza tells us that the laws of different objects ‘restrain’ each other.44 Such a 
pronouncement is incoherent on the Cartesian understanding of laws: the laws are universal and 
unitary. But if laws are powers, it makes perfect sense: the powers of distinct objects can compete 
against each other. The blood might be disposed to move in a certain direction, but this disposition 
can be interrupted, if you like, by the presence of competing causes. In just the same way, a match 
can be disposed to light when struck, and yet not light in an oxygen-free environment. Any given 
event, then, will be the result of the interplay among the laws or dispositions of the objects 
concerned. 
 Such a view has some striking affinities with Aristotelian thought. The nature of fire, on 
such a view, is a disposition to burn things. But whether anything actually is burned is a function 
partly of the passive powers possessed by the objects with which fire comes into contact. An 
Aristotelian science is occupied with discovering these natures or powers and mapping out their 
interactions. 
 To illustrate this stage, Spinoza introduces an analogy. He asks us to imagine things from 
the point of view of a little worm living inside the veins of another creature. To us, the particles 
that make up blood (lymph and chyle, for example) are parts of the blood. But to a worm swimming 
in the blood, endowed with the capacity to distinguish these particles, lymph and chyle are not 
parts but wholes. Spinoza writes, 
 
																																																						
44 ‘There are a great many other causes which restrain the laws of the nature of the blood in a certain way, and which 
in turn are restrained by the blood, it happens that other motions and other variations arise in the particles of the 
blood…’ (1994, 83). 
[The worm] would live in this blood as we do in this part of the universe, and would 
consider each particle of the blood as a whole, not as a part. Nor could it know how 
all the parts of the blood are restrained by the universal nature of the blood, and 
compelled to adapt themselves to one another, as the universal nature of the blood 
requires, so that they harmonize with one another in a certain way.45 
 
The worm, it seems, is missing out on two things. First, it cannot see how the particles, which it 
regards as wholes, are themselves parts of the blood and so are ‘restrained by’ the nature of the 
blood. The explanation for how the lymph particle behaves involves the nature of the blood as a 
whole. Just as we do (at least before we come to realize the truth), the worm sees every variation 
in powers as a mark of a new whole, a new and complete object, endowed with a novel set of 
powers. The Aristotelian watching fire burn paper has done the same thing. 
 Second, the worm has no way of knowing that there is anything beyond the blood. And 
just as the particles of the blood ‘adapt themselves’ to one another, so the blood itself is adapted 
to or harmonizes with the body of which it is a part. And of course beyond the human body itself 
there are many other things that affect the blood, whether directly or indirectly. 
 Spinoza sums up the point of his example in this way: 
 
Now all bodies in Nature can and must be conceived as we have here conceived the 
blood, for all bodies are surrounded by others, and are determined by one another 
to existing and producing an effect in a certain and determinate way, the same ratio 
of motion to rest always being preserved in all of them at once, that is, in the whole 
																																																						
45 1994, 83. 
universe. From this it follows that every body, insofar as it exists modified in a 
certain way, must be considered as a part of the whole universe, must agree with 
the whole to which it belongs, and must cohere with the remaining bodies. And 
since the nature of the universe is not limited, as the nature of the blood is, but is 
absolutely infinite, its parts are restrained in infinite ways by this nature of the 
infinite power, and compelled to undergo infinitely many variations.46 
 
What we call ‘bodies’ are not wholes but parts of the entire universe. An infinite mind would stand 
to all bodies as we stand to the blood. Our grouping of the modes we experience into bodies is a 
function of our benighted epistemic state; what is real is only the single substance.47 And our belief 
that they exhibit genuinely different powers is also an illusion: since all (physical) modes are 
modes of extension, they share a nature, and their behavior is fully explicable by that single nature.  
Thus Letter 32 presents a pathway by which one might navigate from a naïve initial 
position – roughly the Aristotelian view – to a metaphysically sound, Spinozistic view. We begin 
with the claim that the physical world is exhaustively characterized by a single attribute, viz., 
extension. For the various Aristotelian natures, with all their attendant and competing powers, we 
substitute a single nature and a single set of dispositions and powers.48 One can then identify the 
laws of nature with that nature. And if one takes the further step and treats bodies not as substances 
																																																						
46 1994, 84. 
47 Spinoza’s thoughts here are very much in line with 2p13l7, where he argues that ‘the whole of nature is one 
individual, whose parts, that is, all bodies, vary in infinite ways, without any change of the whole individual.’ For 
more on how the parts can vary while the whole stays the same, see esp. Tad Schmaltz (1997). For our purposes now, 
the important part is the notion that what we call bodies are parts of a single super-individual.  
48 I am not, of course, suggesting that The Worm in the Blood invokes Aristotelian forms. Instead, it is clearly their 
mechanical substitutes Spinoza has in mind: the exercises of the dispositions of the worm and the blood are to be 
understood exclusively in terms of motion-and-rest. 
but as modes, then physical events can be seen as the working-out of a single nature of a single 
substance, across merely epistemically distinct bodies. 
 
3.  
 If Letter 32 moves from the human to the metaphysical image, the Ethics moves in just the 
opposite direction: Spinoza begins in Part 1 with the core notions of his metaphysics. It is left to 
the other Parts to restore, bit by bit, the human image. For our purposes, it will thus be better to 
read the Ethics backwards, working from the roughly Aristotelian picture back to the true 
metaphysical one. 
In Parts Three and Four, we find Spinoza happily attributing different essences to man, 
insects, and horses, even though we know he cannot really be serious. The next level is exhibited 
by the so-called Physical Digression of Part II. There, Spinoza is closest to Bacon, winnowing the 
lineup of distinct essences down to a limited number of forms such as hard, soft, and fluid. Finally, 
when we turn back to Part I, we will find all of this talk falls away, and the one substance and the 
laws of its nature, that is, its power, emerge as the fundamental notions of Spinoza’s metaphysics. 
 Salted throughout the final parts of the Ethics, one can find unapologetically Aristotelian 
language. Perhaps the most important comes in the preface to Part IV, where Spinoza writes, 
 
[W]hen I say that someone passes from a lesser to a greater perfection, I do not 
understand that he is changed from one essence, or form, to another. For example, 
a horse is destroyed as much if it is changed into a man as if it is changed into an 
insect. 
 
Aquinas would not have blushed to write this. Forms are migration barriers; nothing can pass from 
one to another without being destroyed. At this human level, forms and essences are the same 
thing. What that thing is remains obscure. In a way, that is no surprise, for this everyday notion of 
form/essence must be re-figured as we ascend closer to the truth of things.  
 Aristotelian forms have to be analyzed away. In Part III, Spinoza gives us the tools to do 
so: 
 
3p6: ‘Each thing, as far as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its own being.’49  
 
3p7: ‘The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing 
but the actual essence of the thing.’  
 
The conatus or striving is not something added on to a thing, or something it has only because God 
moves it about in a certain way. It is the essence of the thing. Since physical things are not 
substances but modes, their essences are in the end modifications of the attribute of extension. The 
terminology is tangled but the point should be clear: that bodies strive to persist in their own being 
is part of what it is to be a body. 
 To make sense of this, we have to invoke Part II’s Physical Digression (2p13). We know 
from the Definitions at the beginning of that Part that an essence is something the positing of which 
is both necessary and sufficient for the thing’s being posited.50 The Physical Digression reveals 
																																																						
49 Here again I depart from Curley, who renders 3p6 thus: ‘Each thing, as far as it can, strives to persevere in its being 
by its own power.’ As Deborah Brown pointed out to me, nothing in the text justifies Curley’s use of ‘power’: 
‘Unaquaeque res, quantum in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur.’ There is also a philosophical problem in the 
interpretation of this proposition. As it stands, it allows that things sometimes don’t strive to persevere in being; but 
3p7 makes such striving the essence of a thing. Michael Della Rocca (1996, 200) suggests we read 3p6 as saying that 
each thing will persevere in being, so far as it can. It’s the persevering, not the striving, that external forces can prevent. 
50 2pd2.  
that what individuates composite bodies is their differing ratios of motion and rest.51 If we identify 
what makes an individual the individual with its essence, we can say that the essence of, say, a 
horse or a tree is its striving to maintain the same ratio of motion and rest.52 Presumably, if it fails 
in this task, it then disintegrates into its constituent simple bodies.  
 What makes 2p13 so hard to grasp is the fluidity of Spinoza’s jargon. At times, he appears 
to use ‘form’ or ‘nature’ interchangeably, where both mean Aristotelian forms.53 The Physical 
Digression, then, is meant in part as a respectably mechanist reduction of Aristotelian forms to 
ratios of motion and rest. So far, so good. But there is also reason to think Spinoza is using these 
terms to mean something like macro-level property or state. Hard, soft, and fluid, are forms, 
according to Spinoza, and ‘natures’ according to Bacon.54 Unlike Aristotelian essences, things can 
gain and lose these forms without being destroyed.55  
 We have not yet reached the metaphysical image. That is the work of Part I. Not 
surprisingly, or so I shall argue, Spinoza uses the notion of law to make the transition.  
 After establishing that God exists (1p11) and is the only substance (1p14), Spinoza has to 
explain how a single substance can be responsible for the diversity we see around us. His answer 
is precisely what you get when you combine Bacon’s understanding of laws with monism: 
 
1p16: ‘From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely 
many modes...’  
 
																																																						
51 ‘Bodies are distinguished from one another by reason of motion and rest, speed and slowness, and not by reason of 
substance’ (2p13L1). 
52 As Nadler (2006, 195) helpfully points out. 
53 See esp. 2p13L6 and L7. 
54 See Ethics 2p13and NO II.xxv: 140. 
55 Spinoza speaks of the experience and knowledge we derive ‘from observing [things outside us] and changing them 
from one form into another’ (Appendix to Part IV, section xxvii). 
1p17: ‘God acts from the laws of his nature alone, and is compelled by no one.’ 
  
Just as the definition of a triangle entails properties like having angles that sum to 180 degrees, so 
a nature like extension will logically imply an infinite number of properties. If among these 
properties are finite modes, we have some notion of how the attribute of extension might generate 
bodies, i.e., finite modes.  
 In these propositions, we begin to see just how far Spinoza is from the Cartesian concept 
of extension. Spinoza’s extension is not a cadaverous thing awaiting a divine shove; it is active of 
itself.56 Note how Spinoza puts it when it comes time to say how God acts: he acts ‘solus suae 
naturae legibus,’ from the laws of his nature alone. As in Letter 32, Spinoza’s point is that there 
is no competing substance with a different nature, whose laws (that is, powers or dispositions) 
could interfere with God’s. Without the Baconian background, it is impossible to read 1p17 as 
anything other than a long printer’s error.  
Later on in the Ethics, Spinoza again uses the notion of law to knit together the human and 
metaphysical images: 
 
…Nature is always the same, and its virtue and power of acting [‘virtus et agendi’] 
are everywhere one and the same, that is, the laws of nature and the rules according 
																																																						
56 Tschirnhaus (Letter 80) pressed Spinoza on just how extension by itself could entail all the infinity of finite modes 
that are supposed to follow from its nature (E1p16). In answer, Spinoza distances his concept of extension from that 
of Descartes: ‘[F]rom Extension as conceived by Descartes, to wit, an inert mass, it is not only difficult, as you say, 
but quite impossible to demonstrate the existence of bodies. For matter at rest, as far as in it lies, will continue to be 
at rest, and will not be set in motion except by a more powerful external cause. For this reason I have not hesitated on 
a previous occasion to say that Descartes’s principles of natural things are of no service, not to say quite wrong’ (Letter 
81). In Letter 83, Spinoza adds that ‘matter is badly defined by Descartes by means of Extension’ and that ‘it must 
necessarily be explicated by means of an attribute that expresses eternal and infinite essence’ (Quoted in Schmaltz 
1997, 220.) That doesn’t take us very far toward understanding Spinoza’s notion of extension, but it does mark his 
view off from Descartes’s. 
to which all things happen,57 and change from one form to another, are always and 
everywhere the same. So the way of understanding the nature of anything, of 
whatever kind, must also be the same, namely, through the universal laws and rules 
of Nature.58 
 
Change in form is to be attributed to the laws of the one nature that is instantiated in the physical 
world. And since there is but the one nature, there is only one set of laws, that is, one set of 
dispositions or powers. 
The contemporary ear is tempted to seize on Spinoza’s talk of ‘the universal laws and rules 
of nature’ and rush to one of the contemporary analyses of laws of nature on offer. That would be 
a mistake. The question is, in which direction does the reduction run: is it from laws to powers, or 
the other way around?59 What we have already established should make the choice clear: talking 
of laws or rules is just talking of powers or dispositions.60 And just as 1p16 and 1p17 claim, there 
is only one nature in nature, namely, extension; hence its powers are uniform and can never 
encounter a competing nature that might disrupt it.  
 But it is not just his overt claims that force us to read Spinoza’s laws as powers or 
dispositions. His practice, when it comes time to prove propositions Descartes would happily call 
																																																						
57 Here I depart slightly from Curley’s translation. As he has it, Spinoza says that ‘the laws and rules of nature, 
according to which all things happen, are everywhere the same.’ I can understand the desire to avoid repetition, but it 
might be significant that the Latin phrase is ‘naturae leges et regulae secundum quas omnia fiunt,’ that is, ‘the laws 
of nature and the rules according to which all things happen.’  
58 Cp. Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, section 101. 
59 Curley reads the passage as indentifying ‘the laws of nature and nature’s virtue and power of acting’ 
(correspondence, reported in Melamed (2009, 25); cp. Curley (1969, 49) and (1988, 42-3)). On Curley’s view, nature’s 
agency amounts to nothing more than its being rule-governed. That is at best backwards and at worst nonsensical 
(since Spinoza does not have the Cartesian, governing conception of laws). 
60 See Melamed (2009, 25-6) for a selection of possible competing readings of this obscure passage. Melamed 
modestly concludes that ‘the textual source appears too equivocal to support the bold suggestion that God is the most 
general law (or principle) of nature’ (26). 
leges, also supports this reading. In the Physical Digression of 2p13s, Spinoza ‘premise[s] a few 
things concerning the nature of bodies.’ What follows are a set of axioms and lemmas; Spinoza 
never calls them leges. These propositions follow from the nature of body.  
Consider how Spinoza proves Lemma 3, which states, in part, that a body that moves or is 
at rest must be determined to do so by another body, and so on to infinity. Bodies, Spinoza argues, 
are individuated by motion or rest (2p13L1).61 Since each finite mode has another finite mode as 
its cause (1p28), and since we have ruled out cross-attribute causation, a particular body’s motion-
or-rest must have as its cause another body. Given the way bodies are individuated, we can infer 
that this body itself must be in a state of motion-or-rest. And we can then run the same argument: 
there must be yet another body to account for its motion-or-rest, and so on ad infinitum. 
 By contrast, Descartes offers to prove a closely related proposition by appeal to God’s 
nature and activity. His first law in the Principles states that ‘each thing, in so far as it is simple 
and undivided, always remains in the same state, as far as it can [‘quantum in se est’], and never 
changes except as a result of external causes.’62 Putting it that way suggests that there is something 
in the body that explains its persistence in the same state. But Descartes explicitly says that the 
reason this law obtains lies in ‘the immutability and simplicity of the operation by which God 
preserves matter in motion.’63 What is moving is not nearly as important to the law as by whom it 
is being moved. When Spinoza uses the same phrase (‘quantum in se est’) in 3p7, he might well 
be self-consciously inverting Descartes’s position.  
  
																																																						
61 Note that we are dealing with simple bodies (i.e., those individuated solely by motion-or-rest), not composite bodies 
– which are only introduced at the end of A2’.’ It is also important to note that the natures of body that Spinoza speaks 
of in A3’’ and following are not Aristotelian natures but merely hard, soft, or fluid characteristics, all of which are 
explained by mechanical means. 
62 Principles II.37 (AT VIIIA 62/CSM I 240-241). 
63 Principles II.39 (AT VIIIA 63/CSM I 242). 
4. 
 By now, it should be clear that Spinoza has nothing like a Cartesian concept of leges 
naturae, nor the contemporary concept of laws of nature that descends from it. At times, in writings 
less technical than the Ethics, Spinoza is happy to speak of laws as if they were divine decrees. 
But when he is being careful, it is clear that laws of nature are powers or dispositions.  
 What might justly be called the dominant reading of Spinoza on laws, however, imports a 
contemporary conception of laws as general facts that govern the behavior of objects in the 
universe. In their different ways, Edwin Curley, Jonathan Bennett, and Jon Miller subscribe to 
what we might call this ‘general facts’ view.64 It is worth briefly canvassing this view as a foil to 
bring out what is distinctive about my Baconian interpretation.  
The best way to see the appeal of the general facts view is by considering the puzzle it is 
meant to solve. Spinoza distinguishes between finite and infinite modes. Among the latter, we can 
also distinguish mediate and immediate infinite modes, depending on their relationship to the 
attribute in question. The immediate infinite mode under attribute of extension is, according to 
Letter 64, motion and rest; the mediate infinite mode is said, in a notoriously obscure phrase, to be 
facies totius universi, or the face of the entire universe. The challenge is to see how any of these 
infinite modes can be related to finite modes. 
All modes whatsoever must follow from the infinite modes: 
 
																																																						
64 On the question of laws, I believe Curley’s interpretation deserves to be called the ‘orthodox’ position in the 
literature. Both Steven Nadler (2006) and Michael Della Rocca (2008) mention Curley’s position on laws of nature as 
a solution to a number of interpretive problems, though both stop short of fully endorsing it. Jonathan Bennett (1996, 
73) writes, ‘[W]hat could such features [viz., ‘features of the extended world that it instantiates always and 
everywhere’] be? The only convincing answer to this that I know of is Curley’s. He says that infinite modes are causal 
features of the world, and a statement attributing such a mode to the world would be a basic causal law.’ Other 
proponents of the Curley solution include Jon Miller (2003). 
1p23: ‘Every mode which exists necessarily and is infinite has necessarily had to 
follow either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God [an immediate 
infinite mode] or from some attribute, modified by a modification which exists 
necessarily and is infinite’ [a mediate infinite mode]. 
 
And yet every finite mode follows from another finite mode: 
 
1p28: ‘Every singular thing, or any thing which is finite and has a determinate 
existence, can neither exist nor be determined to produce an effect unless it is 
determined to exist and produce an effect by another cause, which is also finite and 
has a determinate existence.’ 
 
The general facts reading has an elegant solution to this problem. If we assume that Spinoza’s laws 
are general facts that govern particular facts, we can say at the same time that any individual finite 
mode follows from the infinite modes, in the way that a particular fact follows from a general one, 
and that each finite mode is produced by another such mode. Curley’s scheme looks like this: 
 
Attribute of extension: the ‘basic’ nomological facts 
 
Immediate infinite mode of extension: derivative but primary nomological facts 
 
Mediate infinite mode: derivative and secondary nomological facts 
 
Finite modes: singular facts.65  
 
So on Curley’s view, a finite mode, plus a law of nature, cooperate to produce a new finite mode.  
 Even those who do not explicitly endorse all of Curley’s views are friendly to his reading 
of laws. Jon Miller, for example, writes, ‘laws are real members of the world and they (along with 
the series of causes of which all finite modes are members) directly determine all that comes to 
happen or exist.’66 Curley goes further: Spinoza ‘identified God with Nature, not conceived as the 
totality of things, but conceived as the most general principles of order exemplified by things.’67  
 There are many reservations one might have about this interpretation. If monism just 
amounts to the claim, ‘there is only one set of general principles,’ it is hard to see why anyone 
would object. Nor is there much ground for thinking that modes of any kind are facts. Nor is there 
any compelling textual basis for treating motion and rest, for example, as derivative nomological 
facts as opposed to motion and rest. The key to finding our way out of the problem posed by 1p23 
and 1p28 is to see, with Richard Mason, that the relation between infinite and finite modes ‘was 
not meant to be a causal one’ in the first place.68 Once we stop assuming that the sense in which 
finite modes follow from the infinite ones has to be causal, we can see our way clear to a reading 
more grounded in the text. 
 Let’s begin with the immediate infinite mode of extension. Spinoza tells us it is motion-
and-rest.69 Recall that an immediate infinite mode is ‘the mode which, in order to exist, needs no 
																																																						
65 Adapted from the chart given by Curley (1969, 63). In epistemic terms: ‘[W]e can look on the fundamental laws of 
nature not only as principles which explain whatever happens in nature, but also as principles which could not, by 
their very nature, be explained by anything else’ (Curley 1988, 44). 
66 Miller (2003, 266). 
67 1988, 42; italics in original. 
68 Mason (1986, 204). 
69 In the Short Treatise, Spinoza claims that the infinite mode (there is no mention of mediate as opposed to immediate 
modes) in extension is simply matter (1994, 85). If, as I shall argue, the (immediate) infinite mode of extension 
underwrites the production of finite modes, it makes sense that he adds ‘rest’ to the mix. 
other mode in the same attribute.’70 Given Spinoza’s nominalism, we should not read him as here 
implying that there is a Platonic universal, motion-and-rest, that emanates from the attribute of 
extension. Instead, this is a claim about extended things: any extended thing will, solely in virtue 
of being extended, be either in motion or at rest.  
 What are we to make of the famously obscure mediate infinite mode of extension, facies 
totius universi? The most natural reading of the phrase, at first glance, takes it to be simply the 
sum total of every extended ‘thing,’ i.e., the aggregate of all finite modes of extension.71 In other 
words, it is the super-individual of 2p13 and of Letter 32.72  
Now, a mediate infinite mode should depend on nothing but the immediate mode. Putting 
all this together, we have the claim that the sum total of all finite modes of extension depends on 
nothing but motion-and-rest. And this is unsurprising, since Spinoza’s bodies are individuated by 
motion and rest. We need appeal to nothing other than motion-and-rest to explain the face of the 
entire universe.73 So although the finite and infinite modes do not causally cooperate, they do stand 
in dependence relations, and that is all we need to make sense of 1p23 and 1p28. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 The way of laws is not just crooked but forked. Pursued in one, broadly Cartesian, 
direction, it leads to occasionalism. For this top-down approach divorces laws from the things that 
																																																						
70 As Bennett reminds us (2001, v.1, 171); the quotation is from Spinoza’s Short Treatise (1661) in Spinoza (1985, 
153n). 
71 See Mason (1986, 205-7) for a fuller defense of this point. As Mason acknowledges, Spinoza is on shaky ground 
when he supposes that a mere aggregate of infinite modes could itself be infinite. 
72 I owe this point to Tad Schmaltz (1997). 
73 So construed, Spinoza’s point would be analogous to Descartes’s claim in Le Monde that God can, simply by 
producing motion, create the world as it appears to us (CSM I 91/AT XI 34-5). Spinoza’s point differs from 
Descartes’s, however, in two key respects: a) Descartes appeals to the laws of nature to explain the order and perfection 
of the universe, and b) Descartes thinks matter would be arranged in such a way as to ‘have the form of a quite perfect 
world.’ 
obey them. The immediate question is: what is responsible for the enforcement of the laws? The 
only candidates for that role in the early modern period are Descartes’s God and Newton’s 
mysterious ‘agent acting constantly according to laws.’74 I have been trying to unearth a distinct 
notion of law that retains its legal flavor but ties it to objects and their powers.75 For Bacon and 
for Spinoza, nature takes the course it does because it has the powers, that is, the laws, that it does. 
There is no lawgiver; there is only power. 
 For both Bacon and Spinoza, laws are inscribed in things. They take the very same legal 
metaphor Descartes does but preserve a different aspect of it. Where Descartes retains the air of 
arbitrariness the metaphor conveys, claiming that it is God’s nature and not that of creatures that 
determines the laws, Bacon and Spinoza appeal to laws to bring out the multi-faceted ways in 
which objects and powers interact. To call a thing’s powers its laws is to emphasize at once its 
enduring and unchanging capabilities and the conditional status of their exercise. In this respect, 
Bacon and Spinoza have more in common with their predecessors than their immediate successors. 
 That the notion of laws as powers looks backward rather than forward will be seen by 
some as a point against my reading.76 To this there are two replies. First, the fact that some 
philosophers should try to defend parts of a worldview that was quickly becoming outmoded is 
neither surprising nor something to be apologized for. What is more important, while their fellow 
																																																						
74 See the Letter to Bentley of 25 February 1692/3, in Newton (2004). Newton argues that ‘it is inconceivable that 
inanimate, brute matter should, without the mediation of something else, which is not material, operate upon and affect 
other matter without mutual contact…’ (2004, 102). ‘Gravity must be caused by an agent acting constantly according 
to certain laws; but whether this agent be material or immaterial, I have left to the consideration of your readers’ (2004, 
103). 
75 This use antedates even Francis Bacon. It occurs in Roger Bacon’s Opus Majus of 1267, where we find the claim 
that the transmission of disease ‘is thus an amazing power, since everything happens in accordance with its laws, both 
hidden and manifest’ (1267/1928, vol.1, 163).  
76 Considering something like the view I defend, Richard Manning (2012) argues that ‘Another, related problem for 
this interpretation is that it represents Spinoza as, not an avant-garde thinker anticipating modern physics, but as a rear 
guard defender, despite his official anti-scholastic stance, of the traditional neo-Aristotelian doctrines of essence and 
substantial form, open to the same charges of ad hoc theorizing and appeal to occult powers that Modernity and the 
Scientific Revolution leveled against it in its their rise to intellectual dominance.’ 
philosophers in the modern period largely abandon the powers-based ontology, it has 
experienced a resurgence in the last forty years or so. Indeed, contemporary authors such as 
Brian Ellis speak of a power’s ‘law of action,’ which ‘describes the kinds of changes that must 
result when the causal power is activated in circumstances of the appropriate kind.’77 Ellis is 
reproducing, if unconsciously, the very concept of law we have recovered. Seen from this wider 
historical perspective, it is the Cartesians who are clinging to a doomed raft, not Bacon and 
Spinoza.78	
																																																						
77 Ellis 2002, 172. 
78 I would like to thank Galen Barry, Michael LeBuffe, Jim Darcy, Mason Pilcher, and especially Antonia LoLordo 
for helpful comments. An earlier version was presented at as a keynote address to the Rotman Summer Institute, 
‘Causal Powers in Science: Blending Historical and Conceptual Perspectives,’ in July of 2014. I am very grateful to 
the conference organizer, Henrik Lagerlund, for the invitation to speak. The paper benefited from many comments 
and criticisms, especially those of Deborah Brown, Jennifer McKitrick, and Calvin Normore.  
